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Breaking the Gilt Standard
- The problem of parity in Kumhof and Noone's design principles for
Central Bank Digital Currencies
Abstract:
This paper is a critical engagement with the four design principles for Central Bank
Digital Currency (CBDC) recently proposed by Kumhof and Noone (KN). It is argued
that the implicit notion of parity underlying KN's analysis is too narrow as it is only
focused on the exchange rate between CBDC and bank deposits. Instead, we develop a
three  dimensional  model  of  parity,  which  also  includes  the  concepts  of  purchasing
power parity and settlement parity. Applying this model to KN's proposal, the paper
identifes four potential breaking points, where their principles provide a weaker defense
of parity between CBDC and bank deposits than what is suggested by their analysis:
Gilt traders may create a break of purchasing power parity as they respond to a crisis
by quoting different gilt prices depending on whether payment is made in CBDC or
bank deposits. Speculators may provoke a break of either purchasing power parity or
exchange rate parity by buying gilts for bank deposits, thus forcing the central bank to
buy gilts for CBDC, and then subsequently selling gilts for CBDC. The Treasury may
find itself forced to break settlement parity, if citizens create a 'run' by using only bank
deposits to make payments to the government, while demanding payments from the
government in CBDC. And finally the central bank cannot use the interest rate on re-
serves as a separate policy tool to guide the risk-free interest rate in the economy as re-
serves carry the risk of a break of settlement parity in relation to CBDC.
Keywords: Central banks, money creation, digital currency, CBDC, monetary poli-
cy, parity
JEL: E40, E41, E42, E50, E51, E52, E58, E61, G21
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Introduction
The debate about central  bank digital  currency (CBDC) is currently marked by a
ketchup effect. For a long time the notion of central banks issuing their own digital
currency was a fringe idea mostly debated among activists and academics at the mar-
gins of the mainstream. But over the course of the past two years the issue has rapidly
picked up speed. This idea is now being researched and debated internationally by cen-
tral banks and other stakeholders with new research reports and central bank state-
ments coming out on a monthly if not on a weekly basis (Barrdear and Kumhof 2016;
Bech and Garratt 2017; Blakstad and Allen 2018; Bordo and Levin 2017; Dyson and
Hodgson 2016; Engert and Fung 2017; Fiedler et al. 2017; Ketterer et al. 2016; Meaning
et al. 2018; Sandal et al. 2018; for overview see Prasad 2018).
CBDC is simultaneously an abstract theoretical idea and a concrete policy proposal.
At the horizon of the academic debate is thus the political question of whether CBDC
should be implemented CBDC or not  (Skingsley 2016; Ingves 2017; Nicolaisen 2017;
Gürtler et al. 2017; Bjerg and Nielsen 2018) As the debate about CBDC is progressing,
we see more and more nuances added. Since CBDC may be implemented in a number
of different ways, the question is not merely whether to implement or not but. Equally
important is the question of  how to implement a CBDC (Bjerg 2017; Meaning et al.
2018).
Working with different co-authors, Michael Kumhof has been at the very forefront
of this debate for several years and his research figures as standard references in studies
on CBDC (Benes and Kumhof 2012; Barrdear and Kumhof 2016). In a recent paper,
Michael  Kumhof and Clare Noone (KN) push the discussion of  how to implement
CBDC an important step further by opening a series of crucial design questions (2018).
They also provide their own answer to these questions by listing four core principles for
a design of a CBDC.
The current paper is a critical engagement with the proposal and analysis of KN.
While KN's core principles are indeed expedient, the paper argues that the design prin-
ciples provide a weaker defense of parity between CBDC and bank deposits than what
is suggested by KN.
The paper begins with a presentation of the key points in the KN paper. Then fol-
lows a discussion and definition of the concept of parity as this is a key issue in KN's
analysis.  This  leads  into  four  consecutive  analytical  sections,  where  four  potential
breaking points of parity are identified. Each of the sections observe the problem of
parity from a different perspective: the central bank, the market, the government and
the banks, and it is investigated, how KN's design proposal respond to different types
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of pressure. The paper concludes by summarizing the findings and discussing their pol-
icy implications.
CBDC design principles
A key concern in debate about CBDC is the potential impact on the functioning of the
existing monetary system. The contribution of KN to this debate is the following:
[I]f the introduction of CBDC follows a set of reasonable core principles,
then the banking sector’s two key functions, the provision of credit to bor-
rowers and the provision of liquidity to depositors, are not necessarily cur-
tailed. (2018, 5)
The concern with regards to the first of these key functions is that the introduction
of CBDC may prevent banks from funding loans through the creation of new deposits
thus limiting their capacity for credit provision (Broadbent 2016; Gürtler et al. 2017;
Fiedler et al. 2018). The challenge is that if borrowers insist on having loans paid out
in CBDC, banks can only lend out money to the extent that they can secure funding
from savers. Banks would be fully or partially reduced to simple financial intermedi-
aries rather than suppliers of money.
The concern with regards to the second of the two key functions is that the intro-
duction of CBDC might facilitate a digital bank run thus causing financial instability
(Carney 2016;  Skingsley 2016).  The challenge is  that if  money users are given the
choice between holding risk-free CBDC and holding bank deposit money, which ulti-
mately carries a credit risk, they may opt for the latter thus forcing banks to pay out
CBDC in exchange for bank deposits.  If  this happens on a significant scale,  banks
would soon find their stock of CBDC depleted and they would turn to the central bank
as CBDC lender of last resort. The central bank would in turn be obliged to supply the
banks with CBDC in exchange for various kinds of more or less risky assets.
The core principles proposed by KN to counter these two challenges are:
(i) CBDC pays an adjustable interest rate.
(ii) CBDC and reserves are distinct, and not convertible into each other.
(iii) No guaranteed, on-demand convertibility of bank deposits into CBDC
(via an obligation on commercial banks or the central bank to guarantee
convertibility).
(iv) The central bank issues CBDC only against eligible securities (princi-
pally government securities). 
(2018, 5)
The most original  contribution in KN's solution is probably principle (iii).  It  is
based on the counterintuitive idea that parity between bank deposits and CBDC is best
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secured by committing neither commercial banks nor central banks to converting the
former into the latter at their nominal price. This sets KN apart from many other pa-
pers on CBDC that assume this convertibility as given (eg. Meaning et al. 2018). KN's
reasoning is that rather than banks and central banks taking on a commitment, which
they may not be able to honor under extreme circumstances, it is better to not take on
the commitment at all. This way the credibility of banks is not impaired, if they cannot
meet customers demand for CBDC, as they have never made such a promise in the first
place. 
Instead of maintaining parity through the commitment of banks and the central
bank, KN propose a market solution combined with CBDC interest rate adjustments
by the central bank. This is where principle (i) comes into play. The demand for con-
version of bank deposits into CBDC and vice versa is met by non-bank private sector
agents acting as CBDC exchanges. Assuming that bank deposits and CBDC have the
same utility as a means of payment, their value will deviate according to the fact that
CBDC is a risk-free store of value, while bank deposits carry a credit risk. In order to
maintain parity between the two forms of money in spite of the difference in credit
risk, the central bank adjusts the interest rate on CBDC to create a spread relative to
the bank deposit rate. The central bank thus applies a quantity rule (fixing the quan-
tity of CBDC and adjusting the price) to make sure that supply and demand in the
market for CBDC/bank deposit conversion clears.
The point of leaving the conversion of bank deposits into CBDC and vice versa to
non-bank market agents is that shifts in the portfolio preferences of money users do not
affect the size of bank balance sheets or the overall stock of liquid money. The conver-
sion of bank deposits into CBDC by one money user is only possible through a counter
party accepting the inverse conversion, which offsets the macroeconomic implications of
the transaction.  This  differs  from a scenario,  where  banks perform the conversion.
When a bank responds to the demand by a customer for the conversion of bank de-
posits into CBDC, it removes CBDC from the asset side of its balance sheet and de-
stroys deposits from its liability side. This balance sheet contraction decreases the over-
all stock of liquid money in the economy.
Principle (ii) extends the non-convertibility between bank deposits and central bank
money to also encompass reserves. One of the reasons for this principles is to prevent a
bank run 'by the back door'. Such a scenario might occur if a narrow bank with access
to a central bank reserve account and the central bank clearing system (RTGS in the
UK) were to offer conversion of bank deposits for CBDC to customers. This narrow
bank would then receive bank deposits from other banks thus obliging these banks to
clear the transaction through the transfer of reserves into the narrow bank's account
with the central bank. The narrow bank could then respond to customers' demand for
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CBDC by exchanging reserves for CBDC at the central bank and paying this out to
customers in return for deposits. The end result would be the same as in a regular bank
run 'by the front door'. Banks losing deposits would ultimately run out of reserves and
the central bank would be forced to either step in as lender of last resort or terminate
conversion of reserves for CBDC.
Another argument for keeping reserves distinct from CBDC is that it allows the cen-
tral bank to retain the policy rate as an independent monetary policy tool. While the
rate on CBDC is adjusted to maintain parity with bank deposits and thus financial sta-
bility, the policy rate on reserves can be used separately to manage price stability in
the economy.
The final  principle (iv) provides  the central  bank with a second line of  defense
against pressure on the parity between CBDC and bank deposits. In addition to the
above mentioned adjustment of the interest rate on CBDC (quantity rule), the central
bank may also adjust its quantity by issuing CBDC against eligible asset (price rule).
Such assets would normally be constituted by government bonds (gilts in the UK). Pri-
vate sector agents such as CBDC exchanges would thus be able to respond to an exces-
sive demand for CBDC by using bank deposits to purchase gilts in the market, which
are then subsequently exchanged for CBDC with the central bank. This mechanism for
CBDC issuance in exchange for gilts makes sure that no bank deposits are destroyed
and thus aggregate bank funding is not affected in the process. The exception is of
course if the seller of gilts for bank deposits is a bank, but this would only occur on the
initiative of the bank itself. The mechanism also safeguards the central bank from hav-
ing to fund commercial banks directly by being forced to accept their IOUs in exchange
for CBDC. 
The gist of the four principles, as proposed by KN, is that they allow for a largely
market based solution to the maintenance of parity between CBDC and bank deposits,
where the central bank is not directly committed to convertibility and is only obliged
to accept government liabilities in exchange for CBDC. Parity between the two forms
of money is crucial because it is key to making sure that banks can continue funding
themselves through deposit creation and that deposits continue to circulate as liquid
means of payment. In this manner, CBDC may be introduced without significantly al-
tering the way that the money and banking system currently functions.
The Problem of Parity
We may conceive of the problem that KN is trying to solve by their four principles as a
problem of parity. Our existing monetary system already consists of three different
forms of money, which all count as units of the national currency: physical cash, central
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bank reserves, and commercial  bank deposits. It is the responsibility of the central
bank and other monetary authorities to make sure that these three forms of money cir-
culate at par. By implementing CBDC we are introducing a fourth kind of money into
this system. This further complicates the task of managing parity. The concerns of KN
quoted at the beginning of the previous section are essentially concerns that parity be-
tween CBDC and bank deposits breaks down thus upsetting the opportunities for com-
mercial bank credit creation and liquidity provision.
What is parity? Before we venture into a review of the implications of KN's pro-
posal, we shall take a philosophical step back to define and reflect on the concept of
parity. As a first definition, parity simply just means equal or equivalent. In the con-
text of monetary economics, this means that different forms of money circulate at equal
value. The value of money, however, is always defined in relation to something else.
Money has multiple functions and thus the value of money manifests itself along differ-
ent dimensions. This also means that parity manifests itself along different dimensions.
And by implication this finally means that parity can break down in different dimen-
sions. It is common place to distinguish between three functions of money: store of
value, medium of exchange and unit of account. We can use these three functions to
develop a three dimensional definition of parity. The definition is illustrated in figure 1.
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Figure 1: Three Dimensions of Parity
The most direct way of observing parity is when we use money to exchange for
other kinds of money. It implies that different kinds of money are exchanged at their
nominal value. In the context of our analysis this means that £100 of bank deposits
may be exchanged for £100 of CBDC. They trade at 1:1. This kind of parity is related
to the function of money as a store of value. The market prices money according to its
quality as a store of value. When bank deposits and CBDC trade at par, the market
has priced them as equal stores of value. We shall refer to this as exchange rate parity,
which is represented by the red circle. Exchange rate parity is the kind of parity that
KN is focused on in their analysis. 
Obviously money is not only used to buy other forms of money but also to purchase
goods, services and other kinds of assets in the economy. It functions as a medium of
exchange. Along these lines parity exists  when similar amounts of different kinds of
money buy similar amounts of goods, services or assets. This implies, for instance, that
when  traders  sell  securities  such  as  gilts,  they  quote  only  one  price  regardless  of
whether buyers pay in bank deposits or CBDC. We shall refer to this as  purchasing
power parity, which is represented by the yellow circle.
A third use of money is for the settlement of debt. We can connect this with the
function of money as a unit of account. Money functions as a unit of account in so far
as it constitutes an abstract measure of value. This allows us to quote prices in terms
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of currencies such as Pounds or Kroner. But in order for a currency to function as an
abstract unit of account it also has to designate a concrete unit of account. The cur-
rency has to define, what counts as a unit of the currency. What counts as a Pound?
What counts as a Krone? A crucial element in the designation of the concrete unit of
account of a currency is the definition of the units, which count as settlement of debts.
This is what we find in legal tender laws. But even if a unit is not legally defined as le-
gal tender, it may still de facto function to settle some forms of debt. When equal
amounts of different forms of money settle equal amounts of debt, parity exists. We
shall define this as settlement parity, which is represented by the green circle. Since the
major creditors in our economy are banks and the government, their acceptance of
CBDC, reserves and bank deposits in debt settlement is crucial to the designation of
the concrete units of account and the maintenance of settlement parity.
The point of this three dimensional definition is that we should think of parity as a
chain composed of several links. This is why  figure 1 is composed of so-called Bor-
romean rings. They are mutually overlayered in a way, where they keep each other to-
gether. But if one of the rings is broken, the other two can also drift apart. If one form
of parity breaks down, the break transmits to the other two and parity as such breaks
down. As mentioned, KN is only focused on exchange rate parity. This means that
their analysis is not sufficiently sensitive to weaknesses in other links in the chain of
parity. In the following, we shall identify four potential breaking points in the chain of
parity.
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Analysis
The following analysis proceeds to explore,  how the three forms of  parity are con-
nected. In the first section we shall identify the limits of the central banks defense of
exchange rate parity. In the second section we shall examine vulnerabilities in purchas-
ing power parity, which may be exploited by traders looking for speculative profits. In
the third section the role of the Treasury in the maintenance of settlement parity is
discussed. And in the fourth section we shall imagine a scenario, where settlement par-
ity between CBDC and reserves in the interbank market breaks down.
1. The Challenge to the Central Bank: How bad can you make good money?
From the history of economics, we know the phrase 'bad money drives out good'
also referred to as Gresham's law. It originally refers to a situation, where different
forms of commodity money circulate at the same nominal value, while there is a dis-
crepancy between their respective commodity values. If, for instance, money users in an
economy hold silver coins of unequal fineness but with the same denomination, they are
likely to use the impurest coins for purchases and debt settlement while hoarding the
purest coins as stores of value. The impure 'bad' coins thus eventually drive the 'good'
fine coins out of circulation.
By virtue of being a claim on the central bank, CBDC carries no credit risk. In com-
parison to bank deposit money, this makes CBDC 'good' money with a better quality
as store of value. The challenge facing central banks is then to prevent 'good' CBDC
from driving out 'bad' bank deposits. This would happen, if  money users where to
hoard CBDC, while trying to convert all their bank deposits into CBDC. To prevent
this, central banks should aim to make the good money as bad as the bad money. In
this section, we shall test the limits of this strategy.
In KN's proposal the central bank first compensates for the difference in the value of
the two forms of money by keeping the interest rate on CBDC lower than the interest
rate on bank deposits: 
For example,  if  the central bank targets a CBDC-to-GDP ratio of,  say,
15%, and at some point in time, and at prevailing CBDC interest rates, the
market demands more CBDC than this target, the interest rate on CBDC
must drop until  the market clears  at  the desired quantity.  An efficient
mechanism needs to exist to facilitate this adjustment. (2018, 30)
As already noted by KN there are certain limits to this quantity rule. If the rate on
bank deposits is low, which is the case in many economies today, the central bank may
be forced to impose negative interest rates on CBDC in order to maintain a spread be-
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tween the two forms of money, which is large enough to dissuade money users from
converting into CBDC:
[T]here are potential limits if this requires a highly negative interest rate,
and if further reductions of the interest rate below this level become politi-
cally difficult. (2018, 34)
The political issue here is that negative interest rates are in effect a tax on money
users to compensate for risk accumulated in the banking sector. If the market becomes
concerned about solvency in the banking sector, it factors credit risk into the relative
pricing of CBDC and bank deposits thus increasing the demand for CBDC. In order to
defend exchange rate parity, the central bank reacts to this by taking a certain percent-
age of the CBDC held by general money users in negative interests. During the finan-
cial crisis of 2007-8 there was already a sense that 'tax payers' money' was used to 'bail
out the banks'. It is questionable, whether the general public is going to accept this
once again especially if it is done in the very direct fashion of imposing negative inter-
est rates on ordinary people's CBDC accounts.
There is an additional problem in imposing negative interest rates on CBDC to de-
fend exchange rate parity. While negative interest rates do indeed make CBDC less at-
tractive to hold, they are also effectively shrinking the supply of CBDC. This creates
an opposite price effect than the one desired by the central bank. As the supply of
CBDC decreases, the price goes up and thus creates additional pressure on the ex-
change rate parity with bank deposits. To what extent this opposite price effect offsets
the initial effect of lowering interest rates is difficult to estimate.
Now KN suggests that even when CBDC interest rates have been lowered to their
political limit, there is an additional effect, which would re-balance exchange rate par-
ity. In order to compensate for the decreasing demand for bank deposits, banks will in-
crease deposit rates:
Given the large reduction in demand for bank deposits at given interest
rates, the interest rate on bank deposits is likely to increase relative to the
policy rate and the CBDC rate, to incentivise households and firms to hold
deposits. (2018, 34)
This reasoning involves a game theoretical problem. If the banks know, that the cen-
tral bank is ultimately committed to the maintenance of parity between bank deposits
and CBDC, why would they jeopardize their profit margin by increasing deposit rates.
In turn, they could just sit back and wait for the central bank to cave in and restore
exchange rate parity by whatever means necessary.
There is an additional twist to this problem of relying on interest rate adjustments
to manage the relative demands for bank deposits and CBDC. In the quote above, KN
refers to a need for an 'efficient mechanism' to 'facilitate this adjustment'. On the one
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hand, such a mechanism would constitute a response to behavior in the market. On the
other hand, it would also constitute a signal to the market, which would influence be-
havior. If, for instance, the central bank lowers the interest rate on CBDC in order to
make markets clear in a situation with excess demand for CBDC, this lowering of the
interest rate would itself feed back into the market as a signal that a concern about
credit risk in the banking sector is justified. This would then trigger even more demand
for CBDC, which would in turn compel the central bank to lower CBDC interest rates
even more, and so on.
When central banks come up against the lower limit of interest rates on CBDC,
they have the option of switching to the second line of defense against a break of ex-
change rate parity, which is the imposition of the price rule. By selling CBDC for eligi-
ble securities, the supply of CBDC may be increased to satisfy increasing demand and
clear the market at par. The existence of such a market, where CBDC and bank de-
posits trade at par (possibly with a transaction fee), relies on the assumption of arbi-
trage opportunities:
Say CBDC is trading at an exchange rate of 1-x to deposits, for x>0. Then
a financial institution can lock in a riskless profit, by taking 1 unit of de-
posit inflow from a customer, buying 1 unit worth of gilts in the market,
immediately selling the gilt to the central bank for 1 unit of CBDC, deliver-
ing 1-x of CBDC to the customer, and keeping x CBDC as riskless profit.
Arbitrage will drive x to zero. Note that it is the central bank’s commit-
ment to pay 1 unit of CBDC for a gilt worth 1 unit of ‘deposit-money’ –
that is, central bank’s use of a parity exchange rate in its operations – that
allows this strategy to work. (Kumhof and Noone 2018, 16 n17)
This assumption is crucial to KN's proposal. But it is also problematic. In order for
the financial institution in question to buy '1 unit worth of gilts in the market' there
has to be a seller of gilts willing to quote the same price regardless of whether payment
is made in bank deposits or CBDC. KN's assumption thus ultimately relies on the will-
ingness of this seller of gilts to absorb the costs of conversion necessary to maintain ex-
change rate parity. Or, in other words, the seller of gilts is assumed to provide the pur-
chasing power parity necessary to defend exchange rate parity. But why would this pri-
vate agent with no responsibility for financial stability do so? There is a tautology in
KN's reasoning.
Since the central bank has switched to the price rule and thus engaged in the pur-
chase of gilts, it is already responding to a situation, where the market values bank de-
posits lower than CBDC. In the words of KN 'CBDC is trading at an exchange rate of
1-x to deposits, for x>0.' This pressure on parity would, however, not only manifest it-
self in the direct exchange rate between CDBC and deposits, it would also be factored
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into the pricing of securities and other objects of trade in the market. Pressure on ex-
change rate parity would transmit to a pressure on purchasing power parity.
For illustration, we can think of a classical bank run scenario such as the one we
saw during the Greek debt crisis in 2015. The crisis not only caused banks to impose a
cap on daily cash withdrawals. In response to the fear of a widespread collapse in the
banking system, restaurant owners,  filling stations and other merchants reacted by
charging a higher price for credit card payments or by refusing to accept anything but
cash payments. The pressure on exchange rate parity between cash and bank money
manifested itself in a divergence in the prices of goods and services and thus a break in
purchasing power parity.
In a situation, where there are doubts about the parity between CBDC and bank de-
posits, we should thus expect gilt traders to react in the same fashion as Greek restau-
rant owners. They have the option of selling their gilt in the open market for bank de-
posits or selling them directly to the central bank for CBDC. To the extent that they
would even consider the former, we should expect them to charge a higher price for
payment in bank deposits. If CBDC is trading at an exchange rate of 1-x for deposits,
for x>0, the gilt trader is going to want a compensation of x in order to sell for de-
posits. Two prices of gilts will emerge and at that moment, the parity, which was sup-
posed to be defended, breaks down. 
The tautology in KN's reasoning is that they expect the gilt sellers to trust parity to
be maintained and thus sell their gilts for bank deposits, while at the same time it is
these very same gilt sellers, who are the ultimate bulwark against the break of parity,
because they are expected to absorb the excess of bank deposits in the economy in ex-
change for gilts. The 'gilt standard' of CBDC proposed by KN therefore only works un-
der the assumption that gilt traders are altruists, who are primarily concerned with the
general stability of the financial system. This is hardly a reasonable assumption. In
turn, we should expect them to factor the risk of a break of parity into gilt prices by
charging a premium on payments in bank deposits.
Once the purchasing power parity is broken and gilt buyers have to pay a premium
for payment in bank deposits an arbitrage opportunity emerges, which puts additional
pressure on exchange rate partiy: First, you sell bank deposits for CBDC at par or
close to it. Then you buy gilts for CBDC at a relatively low price. These gilts may then
be sold for bank deposits at a nominally higher price. The bank deposits may then be
exchanged for CBDC at par, and you can start all over again. As traders exploit this
opportunity, exchange rate parity is eventually going to break and widen even more.
Arbitrage opportunities thus move the market away from rather than towards parity.
The conclusion to this section is that neither the adjustable interest rate on CBDC
nor the possibility for the central bank to increase the supply of CBDC in exchange for
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eligible securities  are sufficient tools  to guarantee parity.  The two tools  may work
nicely under normal conditions, when there are no concerns about the general health of
the banking sector and the money users' preferences for holding CBDC or bank de-
posits are determined by matters of habit and convenience. But the robustness of a
money system should not be measured on its performance under normal conditions but
rather on its performance in a crisis. A key purpose of the four core principles proposed
by KN was to avoid: 
open[ing] the door to aggregate bank runs, with a counterpart in the central
bank becoming a large, and potentially partly unsecured, creditor of the
banking system. (2018, 31)
This is achieved by making sure that
[c]onvertibility of bank deposits into CBDC does ... not have to be ensured
by banks themselves, and the central bank ... does not need to stand ready
to accept bank IOUs as an eligible asset when issuing CBDC. (2018, 32)
What we have demonstrated is that both the first (quantity rule) and the second
(price rule) line of defense against a break of exchange rate parity are weaker than sug-
gested by KN. This means that in a crisis the central bank is ultimately going to end
up in a situation, where it is indeed compelled 'to stand ready to accept bank IOUs as
an eligible asset when issuing CBDC' and therefore ends up exactly as 'a large, and po-
tentially partly unsecured, creditor of the banking system'. The only other option is for
the central bank to accept the break of parity and thus an ensuing drop in bank fund-
ing, liquidity and eventually solvency. In more popular terms, the central bank will be
faced with the choice between either saving the banks or sticking to its initial monetary
policy principles.
2. The Opportunity in the Market: What would Soros do?
In 1992 financier George Soros became famous by making a successful bet on a devalu-
ation of the British Pound. Two years prior, Britain had joined the European Exchange
Rate Mechanism thus pegging the Pound to a basket of European currencies including
most prominently the German Mark. Since Britain had joined at a high exchange rate
relative to the Mark and was suffering from high inflation and high interest rates, Soros
judged that Britain would not be able to stay within the band of the ERM. By borrow-
ing Pounds and subsequently buying Marks and Francs, he was not only setting himself
up for a profit in the case of devaluation. His trading was also creating additional pres-
sure on the value of the Pound to decrease. In the end, the British monetary authori-
ties had to give in to the pressure and allow the exchange rate of the Pound to fall be-
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low the stipulated limits of the ERM, enabling Soros to make an estimated profit of
£1bn by liquidating his positions.
One of the reasons, why Soros' move on the British Pound has become famous, is
because not only was he betting on a certain future event (Britain leaving the ERM).
His own trading was at least partially instrumental in eventually bringing about this
event. In similar fashion, it is worth considering, to what extent the KN proposal for
CBDC implementation is vulnerable to deliberate trading strategies aimed at exploiting
weaknesses in the system. As we have seen, KN assumes that the exploitation of arbi-
trage opportunities actually helps to stabilize the system as it pushes divergences in ex-
change rate between CBDC and bank deposits towards zero. In this section, we shall
argue that this is not necessarily the case, by analyzing the effects of a trading strategy
aimed at exploiting the central bank commitment to parity. We thus shift our perspec-
tive from the central bank to the market, where we find agents looking for speculative
profits.
The executing agent of our trading strategy is a bank with the possibility of expand-
ing the money supply by creating new deposits. It might also be a hedge fund with ex-
tensive credit lines at a bank. Since the strategy ultimately trades against the central
bank, a number of banks, funds or other market agents acting in concert may create
synergies to increase profits for everyone involved. For simplicity, however, we here
imagine the case of an individual, albeit major, bank triggering the following chain of
events:
1) The bank starts buying up gilts and paying in newly created bank deposits. If the
bank comes up against liquidity restraints as payments in bank deposits come back as
claims for settlement, it may use the gilts as collateral in repos to borrow reserves at
the central bank to make these settlements.
2) The trading increases the ratio of bank deposits to CBDC resulting in a demand for
conversion from the former to the latter as gilt sellers re-balance their  portfolio of
money.
3) As a first line of defense the central bank compensates for this increasing demand by
lowering the interest rates on CBDC. If, however, interest rates are already close to
zero, as is the case today, and our bank is able to keep the pressure by purchasing
enough gilts, the central bank is ultimately compelled to shift to a price rule and start
increasing the supply of CBDC by buying gilts.
4) The bank has now pushed the central bank into a situation comparable to our cur-
rent Quantitative Easing scheme, where central bank demand for gilts puts an upward
pressure on prices.
5) This should be a signal for the bank to accelerate its trading and buy even more
gilts for bank deposits. The effect of this trading is double. First, it pushes up gilt
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prices even further, which allows the bank to increase the value of its existing position.
Second, it increases the supply of bank deposits even more thus forcing central banks
to buy even more gilts for CBDC to defend exchange rate parity thus again increasing
gilt prices even more. (At this stage we are accepting the assumption, which was re-
futed in the previous section, that gilt sellers in the market remain indifferent as to
whether gilt buyers pay in CBDC or bank deposits and purchasing power parity does
not break). The bank cannot create CBDC and the central bank will not accept bank
deposits, so the two parties do not trade directly with each other. In turn, the gilt mar-
ket becomes the venue for their proxy struggle. But since their respective trading be-
haviors do not offset but rather reinforce each other, the market is pushed away from,
rather than towards, equilibrium. The ensuing result is increasing gilt prices.
The profitability of the bank's trading strategy does not necessarily depend on its
ability to eventually break exchange rate parity between CBDC and bank deposits. It
is able to cash in regardless of whether parity breaks or not. We shall explore each of
these scenarios in turn:
6a - parity maintained) The bank may cash in by liquidating its position in gilts. As
long as exchange rate parity is maintained it should sell gilts for CBDC. By doing so it
can maintain the pressure on parity between CBDC and bank deposits even in the
process of liquidating its position. The bank may have ceased increasing the supply of
bank deposits but it still maintains the existing supply. Furthermore, it is increasing
the demand for CBDC. The point of this tactic is to compel the central bank to keep
purchasing gilts for CBDC, while the bank is selling, thus preventing gilt prices to fall
in the process and allowing the bank to lock in the profit from the inflation in gilt
prices. In this trade the two parties may actually become direct counter parties. At
some point the bank may have to use the incoming flow of CBDC to purchase reserves
at parity in the interbank market to redeem its repos thus unlocking even more gilts to
be sold into the market.
7a - parity maintained) Once the bank has converted all gilts into CBDC, it may also
want to restore its balance sheet to its original size by using its excess amount of
CBDC to redeem its excess amount of bank deposit liabilities. This may be done by
settling directly with customers or by selling CBDC into the market for exchange.
Since the central bank will still be committed to the maintenance of exchange rate par-
ity, this final conversion can also be expected to be risk free. The bank thus ends up
with a profit in the form of a remaining surplus amount of CBDC on its balance sheet.
Having profited on this trading strategy, the bank may decide to go back to 1) and re-
peat the trade all over again.
6b - parity broken) Another scenario is that exchange rate parity between CBDC and
bank deposits breaks before the bank has liquidated its trading position. This may hap-
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pen if the central bank gives up trying to supply enough CBDC for gilts to satisfy de-
mand in the market thus allowing the exchange rate between CBDC and bank deposits
to float. It may also happen in the manner already touched upon previously if gilt sell-
ers start quoting different prices depending on whether buyers pay in CBDC or in bank
deposits thus breaking purchasing power parity. In any case, the result is that the bank
deposit price of gilts increases, which allows the bank to profit by selling its stock of
gilts for bank deposits.
7b - parity broken) As the bank receives bank deposits in exchange for gilts, it is able
to settle its own outstanding balance of bank deposit liabilities incurred in the initial
process of purchasing gilts. As these balances are settled the bank also receives an in-
flow of reserves, which it can use to settle repos and thus unlock more gilts for selling.
Ultimately this restores the balance sheet of the bank to its original size, while also
providing the bank with a net profit due to it having bought gilts for bank deposits,
when parity was still intact, and now selling, when parity is broken.
The funding costs of executing the strategy is constituted by the interests paid on
the surplus amount of deposits, the interests paid on repos required to make settle-
ments, as well as possible negative interest rates paid on CBDC. These costs are par-
tially offset by interests received on gilts and CBDC, if the latter are not negative. The
amount of these costs of course depend on the time it takes to execute the strategy.
Since the strategy is likely to be more effective the faster it is executed, the profitabil-
ity of the trade should not be significantly affected by these costs.
In the previous section, we have seen how concerns about solvency and credit risk in
the banking sector may trigger a pressure on parity between CBDC and bank deposits,
which the central bank is ultimately unable to defend without relinquishing one or
more of  KN's core principles.  The point of  this  section is  that  speculative trading
strategies may deliberately provoke a similar situation. If parity is not broken (6a and
7a), there is nothing preventing the bank as well as other agents in the market, who
have caught on to the strategy, from repeating the trade over and over again. As long
as  the  central  bank  remains  committed  to  maintaining  parity  by  buying  gilts  for
CBDC, the bank may claim an arbitrage profit by buying gilts for bank deposits and
selling for CBDC. Since this is obviously not sustainable, the central bank will ulti-
mately find itself faced with the same dilemma as in the previous section: give up on
the initial core principles by accepting other assets than gilts and eventually bank IOUs
in exchange for CBDC, or give up the defense of parity by allowing exchange rates to
float.
While KN assume that speculative trading in the market means that '[a]rbitrage will
drive x to zero' and thus reestablish parity, the above analysis suggests that the central
bank commitment to parity, even if it is not executed through direct convertibility,
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provides arbitrage opportunities for speculative traders that will  drive x away from
zero and thus exacerbate rather than alleviate pressure on parity.
3. The Role of the Treasury: How should we pay our taxes?
Our third issue about the consistency and efficiency of KN's core principles for the im-
plementation of CBDC regards the role of the state in the form of the Treasury. While
the Treasury has no direct responsibility for money creation and monetary policy, it
still plays a vital role in the constitution of a currency as a unit of account. This is re-
lated to the concept of settlement parity. While KN fails to discuss this aspect of par-
ity, it is an issue that has to be considered in the design of CBDC. 
As the mediator of economic transactions between the citizens and the government
the Treasury collects taxes and manages public expenditure. In advanced economies
this constitutes a very significant portion of the total flow of money in the economy.
The Treasury, on behalf of the government, constitutes the largest and most significant
money user in the economy. Practically all money users in the economy will ultimately
have to use some of their money to settle tax bills and other forms of debt to the gov-
ernment. This means that the designation of the concrete units, which money users can
use to settle their tax debts, plays a decisive role in determining, what counts as money
in the economy at large.
The fact that taxes and other payments to the government today can be paid in
bank deposits at the nominal  value helps sustain settlement parity of  this  kind of
money. One of the reasons, why £100 of bank deposits is worth exactly £100 is because
it can be used to settle a debt of £100 with the government. This further helps consti-
tute bank deposits as a concrete unit of account in the economy. One pound of bank
deposits is one pound.
The issue at stake here is how the Treasury manages the different kinds of money as
they flow through the state budget. As we have seen, the gist of KN's proposal is that
neither commercial banks nor central banks should be directly responsible for the con-
version of bank deposits into CBDC. Instead, exchange rate parity is supposed to be
maintained in the market. But as we have also seen, pressure on exchange rate parity
may propagate into a pressure on purchasing power parity as gilt sellers may no longer
accept bank deposits at parity in exchange for gilts. Furthermore, the idea of closing
the doors of commercial banks and the central bank to potential bank runners may just
redirect the pressure on parity towards the Treasury. This would constitute a pressure
on settlement parity.
Today we take it for granted that taxes can be paid in bank deposits, since this is
the only form of digital money, which is accessible to all money users. With the imple-
19
mentation of CBDC, however, this arrangement becomes much less self-evident. In an
economy with both CBDC and bank deposits, the role of the Treasury has to be de-
fined with regards to the following question: Which kind(s) of money can citizens use
to pay their taxes? Ignoring the role of cash, which currently plays a negligible role in
the administration of public finances, there are three possible answers to this question:
1) Treasury accepts both bank deposits and CBDC at the discretion of money users in
the payment of taxes.
2) The Treasury accepts only bank deposits in the payment of taxes.
3) The Treasury accepts only CBDC in the payment of taxes.
We shall explore these three options in turn with regards to their implications for the
maintenance of parity:
(1) In order to support the continued circulation of bank deposits, the Treasury may
decide to leave it up to the citizens, whether they want to settle their tax and other
payments to the government in bank deposits or CBDC. This is a commitment to set-
tlement parity. As the Treasury receives an inflow of CBDC and bank deposits it has
to subsequently balance its portfolio of the two kinds of money. There are two ways of
doing this: It can manage its outflow of expenditures to match the ratio between bank
deposits and CBDC in the inflow of revenue, or it can exchange bank deposits for
CBDC and vice versa with private agents in the market. In this respect, the Treasury
manages its portfolio of bank deposits and CBDC just like any other non-financial
agent in the economy.
As long as the banking system and the financial markets operate under normal, sta-
ble conditions, this balancing should not constitute a problem. If, however,  a crisis
emerges and there is pressure on the parity between bank deposits and CBDC, money
users may decide to use only bank deposits for their payments to the government. This
would be a version of Gresham's Law, where 'bad' bank deposit money drives 'good'
CBDC out of circulation. While other agents in the economy are in a position to refuse
payments in bank deposits, the Treasury is committed to settlement parity and thus
obliged to accept bank deposits at the nominal value.
Conversely, the opportunities for the Treasury to compensate for the excessive in-
flow of bank deposits relative to CBDC by rebalancing its outflow are probably limited
both politically and legally. It is hardly conceivable that the Treasury can force public
employees, recipients of social benefits, government contractors, etc. to accept bank de-
posits as payments from the state, if there is a public alternative in the form of CBDC.
The  Treasury  may turn  to  the  open  market  for  conversion  of  bank  deposits  into
CBDC. But assuming that parity is already under pressure, the Treasury's demand for
conversion is just going to increase this pressure in the open market and possibly trig-
ger the kind of situation described in the previous sections, where purchasing power
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parity is eventually broken as gilt sellers no longer accept bank deposits as payment at
parity with CBDC.
The point here is that if the Treasury can control neither the CBDC/bank deposit
ratio of its inflow of money nor the CBDC/bank deposits ratio of its outflow of money,
it also cannot control the ratio of its stock of money. This will be determined by the
preferences of money users. In a crisis, the Treasury may be forced to absorb bank de-
posits, which money users do not want, while at the same time having to pay out
CBDC. In effect, the Treasury is thus forced to perform the kind of conversion of bank
deposits into CBDC, which neither commercial banks nor the central bank is obliged to
do. The situation is a kind of 'run on the Treasury'. Such a run would be slower than a
bank run insofar as money users can only offload bank deposits at the Treasury to the
extent that they owe taxes or other debts to the government. The run would last until
the Treasury's stock of CBDC is exhausted at which point it ends up in a liquidity cri -
sis. At this point it may have to abandon settlement parity by only accepting CBDC in
payment of taxes. 
Since the Treasury has an account with the central bank, it has the option of hold-
ing reserve money. The Treasury may thus allow money users to decide, how they want
to make and receive payments to and from the government, but as soon as payments in
bank deposits are made, they are cleared and converted into reserves in the Treasury's
central  bank account.  This  complication,  however,  would  not  solve  the  underlying
problem.
First, the Treasury still remains committed to settlement parity and thus obliged to
accept bank deposits as payments at the nominal value even in a situation of crisis.
Second, the Treasury is faced with the challenge of finding agents in the market, who
are willing to buy reserves in exchange for the CBDC, which it needs to make its pay-
ments. According to KN's principle (ii) 'reserves and CBDC are distinct and not con-
vertible into each other on demand'. This means that the central bank is not going to
help the Treasury make this trade.
Instead, the Treasury has to approach sellers of CBDC in the open market. But in
order for these sellers to receive central bank reserves as payment, the trade has to go
through a commercial bank. The Treasury would transfer central bank reserves to the
commercial  bank and the commercial  bank would credit the account of the CBDC
seller accordingly. But this means that the seller of CBDC would receive bank deposits
in exchange for his CBDC. Since we are assuming a situation of crisis, where parity is
under pressure, the CBDC seller is unlikely to accept payment in bank deposits at the
nominal value. This means that the Treasury would have to pay a premium in reserves
to receive CBDC. Not only does this premium represents a loss between the value of
the money received in taxes and the value of the money used for public expenditure
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but the Treasury's demand for conversion of reserves into CBDC further contributes to
the pressure on exchange rate parity, which constitutes the crisis in the first place, be-
cause it eventually amounts to a supply of bank deposits and a demand for CBDC.
(2) To avoid the challenge of having to match the inflow and outflow of CBDC and
bank deposits respectively, the Treasury may then opt for the second model, which is
to accept only bank deposits in tax payments. Obviously, this would force money users
receiving payments from the government to also accept payment in bank deposits. This
comes up against the limitations that we have already touched upon in the previous
scenario.
If the purpose of CBDC implementation is to provide money users with a genuine
option to choose between two forms of money, a refusal of the Treasury to use CBDC
would defy this purpose as it forces bank deposits onto money users. Especially in a sit-
uation of crisis, it is highly questionable that public employees, recipients of social ben-
efits, government contractors, etc. would accept payment in bank deposits if there is a
safer alternative. Furthermore, one of the arguments sometimes put forward in favor of
CBDC is the potential for financial inclusion of unbanked marginalized groups of peo-
ple. Since such groups tend to rely heavily on social benefits, the payment of social
benefits in bank deposits would prevent CBDC from being of much use to these people.
(3) The third option is then for the Treasury to manage the public budget exclusively
in CBDC. This would remove any problems of cash flow management and would also
relinquish the Treasury from assuming monetary policy responsibility by having to
guarantee settlement parity. At the same time it would also make it much more diffi-
cult for the central bank to manage parity between CBDC and bank deposits. If bank
deposits cannot be used to pay taxes, their utility as means of payment is decreased.
The general ratio of CBDC to bank deposits in the money supply would also have to be
maintained at a relatively high level as money users would constantly demand CBDC
to pay taxes. Bank deposits would now not only carry a credit risk as liabilities of com-
mercial enterprises but also the additional risk, that if parity is broken, citizens holding
bank deposits would have to pay a premium in order to pay their taxes. We might
even ask the question, if bank deposits could be maintained as a concrete unit of ac-
count, that is as money, if they are not supported by the Treasury. If the Treasury
does not support settlement parity between bank deposits and CBDC, how may the
rest of the economy be expected to do so.
There is a further twist to the role of the Treasury in the constitution of a currency.
Not only does the Treasury manage the inflow and outflow of money through the pub-
lic budget. It is also the issuer and primary seller of gilts and other government bonds.
In KN's proposal, the function of gilts is not only to finance government deficit spend-
ing. Gilts are also the exclusive kinds of assets, which the central bank may purchase as
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it supplies CBDC into the economy. In addition to deciding, which kinds of money are
accepted in payments of taxes, the implementation CBDC would also force the Trea-
sury to consider, in which kind of money government debt should be managed. Due to
the technical nature of this issue, it is beyond the scope of this paper to provide any-
thing but the questions, which would have to be considered with regards to gilt is-
suance.
When the Treasury initially sells gilts, it has to decide, whether buyers should pay
in CBDC, bank deposits, reserves or any of the three. At the same time it also has to
decide, how these gilts are denominated. A gilt is a promise to pay certain amounts of
money at certain points in time. With the implementation of CBDC, it would have to
be specified, which kind of money the gilt owner is entitled to receive: CBDC, bank de-
posits or reserves. Since the selling of gilts is often used to finance repayment of older
gilts, which have reached maturity, the inflow of money from the sell and the commit-
ment to pay would have to be somehow matched.
As the issuance of CBDC in exchange for gilts under KN's proposal would cause a
lot of gilts to sit on the balance sheet of the central bank, the denomination of gilts
also has consequences for the kind of assets, which may ultimately end up in the cen-
tral bank. If gilts are redeemed in bank deposits, the central bank would end up hold-
ing the bank IOUs, which KN aims to prevent. If gilts are redeemed in reserves, CBDC
and reserves are no longer as distinct and separate, as KN is aiming to make them. If
gilts are redeemed in CBDC, the Treasury would largely also have to sell them for
CBDC, which brings us back to the parity issues mentioned under option (3) above.
In conclusion to this section, we see how the implementation of CBDC forces the
Treasury into a very difficult situation. A key idea in KN's proposal is to relieve both
commercial banks and the central bank from the direct commitment to exchange rate
parity through conversion of bank deposits into CBDC. Invariably, this merely passes
the buck onto the Treasury, which is faced with questions of how to deal with settle-
ment parity. If the Treasury adopts the first option and accepts both bank deposits and
CBDC in payment of taxes and other forms of debt to the government, it assumes re-
sponsibility for settlement parity and thus absorbs some of the risk from the monetary
system. If it adopts the second option and accepts only bank deposits, it transmits this
risk onto money users. And if it adopts the third option it pushes the risk and also the
responsibility for parity maintenance back onto the banks and the central bank. 
4. The Debt of the Banks: Who wants reserves?
So far we have only considered parity in the relation between CBDC and bank de-
posits. In this section, we shall be turning to the relation between CBDC and central
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bank reserves.  Since the primary function of  reserves  is  in the settlement of  debts
among banks, this issue is also related to settlement parity.
KN address the relation between CBDC and central bank reserves in their second
design principle. According to this principle 'reserves and CBDC are distinct, and not
convertible into each other on demand.' We have already discussed, how one of the ob-
jectives of this principle is to prevent bank runs 'by the back door' through reserve-
backed narrow banks. KN also state a second objective of keeping CBDC and reserves
distinct, which is to allow the central bank to maintain the rate on reserves as separate
monetary policy tool. While KN's principle may indeed make sense on the grounds of
this first objective, we shall question, whether it is going to achieve the second objec-
tive stated by KN. Here is how KN present this second objective of principle (ii):
[T]his principle enables reserves and CBDC to have a separate core pur-
pose, in particular CBDC does not have to function as the interbank settle-
ment asset or be bound by the same rules as RTGS. This allows the central
bank to operate a second policy instrument, specifically the quantity of or
the interest rate on CBDC. This could be used as a tool for monetary pol-
icy or for financial stability, while enabling the central bank to retain con-
trol over the quantity of reserves in the financial system, which has tradi-
tionally been a key mechanism through which central banks control the
rate on reserves. Retaining control over reserves allows the central bank to
continue to influence the risk-free interest rate in the economy, the key rate
for real investment decisions and intertemporal allocation decisions. (2018,
9)
There is a flaw in the reasoning of KN here. On the one hand, they argue that
CBDC and reserves are two distinct forms of money. On the other hand, they fail to
see how this distinction will present a risk to parity between the two forms of money.
The flaw is derived from a failure to regard the differences between CBDC and reserves
not only in terms of their function as means of exchange and stores of value but also in
terms of their function as units of account. The difference between CBDC and reserves
in terms of their function as units of account means that in the event of a crisis, it is
not  only the parity between CBDC and bank deposits  that  comes under  pressure.
There will also be a pressure on the parity between CBDC and reserves. And in the
event that parity breaks down, reserves will end up following the price of bank deposits
rather than the price of CBDC. We shall expand on the reasoning behind such a sce-
nario by reviewing CBDC and reserves in terms of the three functions of money (see
Bjerg 2017):
As means of exchange there is an obvious difference between CBDC and reserves.
While reserves are only accessible to banks and certain other agents with an account at
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the central bank, CBDC are universally accessible to all money users. The superior
functionality of CBDC makes it more valuable as a means of exchange. KN invokes the
concept of 'convenience yield' to account for this difference.
As stores of value CBDC and reserves are in the first instance similar. Both are is-
sued by the central bank and by definition they carry no credit risk. The proposal of
KN, however, allows the central bank to pay different interest rates on CBDC and re-
serves. If the interest rate on reserves is higher than on CBDC, the former is a superior
store of value. The convenience yield and the interest rate spread between CBDC and
reserves establish a balance between the two. CBDC has more value as means of ex-
change and reserves has more value as a store of value.
Now we turn to the third function of money, which is not considered by KN. As
units of account there is a crucial difference between CBDC and reserves. CBDC can
be used to settle all kinds of debt in the economy at the nominal value. £100 of CBDC
settles any form of debt of £100. Reserves, however, can only be used to settle debts
between banks or debts to the central bank. This is what happens in interbank clearing
systems such as the RTGS (Depending on the design of the role of the Treasury, as dis-
cussed in the previous section, banks might also be able to settle their debts with the
government using reserves. For simplicity, we disregard this option in the current dis-
cussion). The value of reserves as concrete units of account is that they function as set-
tlement for debts incurred by the processing of payments in bank deposits. £100 of re-
serves allow the bank to settle a payment of £100 of bank deposits on behalf of one of
the bank's customers.
Under normal circumstances, when the monetary system is in a stable condition and
there is no more pressure on parity than what the central bank can manage through in-
terest rate adjustments and gilt purchases, the above mentioned balance established by
the convenience yield and the interest spread will maintain settlement parity and cause
CBDC and reserves to count equally as units of account.
But now imagine a situation of crisis, when there is pressure on the exchange rate
parity in the market. We assume that it takes £110 of bank deposits to buy £100 of
CBDC. Which units would count as concrete units of account in this situation and
what would be the price of reserves in this situation?
Imagine a Bank A, which has a balance sheet consisting of CBDC and reserves on
its asset side and bank deposits on its liability side. A customer in Bank A, Alan, now
wants to buy a car. He has a deposit of £11.000 in Bank A. The seller of the car is
Benny, who is a customer in Bank B. Since exchange rate parity is broken, Benny
quotes two prices for his car. If Alan pays in CBDC the price is £10.000 and if Alan
pays in bank deposits the price is £11.000. Since Alan has no CBDC, he pays in bank
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deposits and asks his bank to make the transfer to Benny. In order to settle the trans-
action, Bank A has to transfer £11.000 of reserves to Bank B.
Bank A may also offer another solution to Alan. Instead of making the payment
through Bank B, Bank A offers to make the payment in CBDC directly to Benny. Alan
would still be charged £11.000 of bank deposits but Bank A would only have to trans-
fer £10.000 of CBDC to Benny. In this scenario, we would soon see a very clear mani-
festation of the break down of parity as banks would offer each other the opportunity
to settle payments in CBDC rather reserves at a discount. It would, in other words,
take only £10.000 of CBDC to settle a debt of £11.000 reserves. Settlement parity be-
tween CBDC and reserves has broken down. While £100 of CBDC would still be £100,
£100 of reserves are no longer £100. 
Just like the difference in credit risk between CBDC and bank deposits would be
factored  into  the  market  price  of  the  two  forms  of  money  even  before  any  crisis
emerged, so would the difference in settlement parity risk be factored into the relative
pricing of CBDC and reserves. The problem here is not the same as in the relation be-
tween CBDC and bank deposits, where the central bank has to prevent mass conver-
sion of the latter into the former. If banks were to switch into using CBDC instead of
reserves in their mutual settlements, this would not necessarily be a threat to financial
stability. In fact this is the model proposed in several other papers, where CBDC sim-
ply constitutes universal access to reserves (Bordo and Levin 2017; Meaning et al. 2018;
Niepelt 2018).
The argument here is rather that the principle of keeping reserves and CBDC dis-
tinct is not going to achieve the objective of allowing the central bank to maintain the
reserve rate as a separate monetary policy tool to 'influence the risk-free interest rate in
the economy'. Reserves may be free of credit risk. But as we have seen, this does not
make them free of the risk of a break of parity. The interest rate on reserves would no
longer be a proxy for the risk-free interest rate in the economy. Since CBDC is the only
digital unit of account, which would remain a concrete unit of account in the event of a
crisis, the interest rate on CBDC and not the reserve rate would be the risk-free inter-
est rate in the economy and thus also 'the key rate for real investment decisions and in-
tertemporal allocation decisions'. The policy rate on reserves may indeed be adjusted
separately from the rate on CBDC but it would have little macroeconomic significance
and thus be a blunt monetary policy tool.
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Conclusion
The purpose of the four design principles proposed by Kumhof and Noone is to enable
an introduction of CBDC, which does not curtail the two key functions of the banking
section: provision of credit to borrowers and provision of liquidity to depositors. This
means that the introduction of CBDC would not upset the functioning of the existing
monetary system, where bank deposits constitute the primary form of money. CBDC
and bank deposits would be able to circulate in parallel and at parity. 
The conclusion to the analysis is that the design principles provide a weaker defense
of parity that what is suggested by KN. The analysis has identified four different po-
tential breaking points in the chain of parity. These breaking points are added to the
figure presented previously. Figure 2 thus serves to summarize the argument of the pa-
per. The numbers in the figure roughly refer to the breaking points explored in each of
the analytical sections. As we have seen, the different dimensions of parity are inti-
mately connected, which means that there are several overlaps in the analyses.
Figure 2: Breaking Points in the Chain of Parity
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Even though KN's proposal relieves the commercial banks as well  as the central
bank from the commitment to provide direct convertibility between bank deposits and
CBDC, the central bank still  remains ultimately responsible for the maintenance of
parity between the two kinds of money. The argument of the paper is that neither the
adjustable interest rate on CBDC nor the possibility for the central bank to increase
the supply of CBDC in exchange for gilts are sufficient tools to guarantee parity in the
event of a crisis. As a first line of defense, the lowering of interest rates on CBDC even-
tually comes up against a lower bound. As a second line of  defense,  the selling of
CBDC in exchange for gilts only works as long as traders are willing to quote the same
price for gilts regardless of whether payment is made in bank deposits or CBDC. Since
the reason, why the central bank is selling CBDC in the first place, is that CBDC does
not trade at par with bank deposits, gilt traders would hardly be willing to accept bank
deposits in exchange for gilts without a premium. Rather than reestablishing parity,
the central bank's selling of CBDC for gilts would merely function to transmit pressure
on exchange rate parity onto purchasing power parity.
A foreseeable side effect of the central bank's defense of parity through the selling of
CBDC for gilts is an upward pressure on gilt prices. The analysis has demonstrated
how this opens up the possibility of speculative trading exploiting arbitrage opportuni-
ties that increase rather than settle pressure on parity. When banks or affiliated specu-
lative agents buy gilts using newly created bank deposits, they put pressure on parity,
as gilt sellers re-balance their portfolio of money by selling bank deposits for CBDC.
This may eventually compel the central bank to defend parity by selling CBDC for
gilts. If speculators keep buying gilts for bank deposits, they can drive drive up gilt
prices even more. When the speculators wish to lock in their profits, they can either be-
gin selling gilts for CBDC, thus retaining an excess of bank deposits in the economy
forcing the central bank to keep buying gilts, or, in case parity breaks, they can sell
gilts at a premium for bank deposits. Contrary to KN's assumption, that speculative
trading will drive price differences between CBDC and bank deposits to zero, this pa-
per argues that the central bank commitment to parity may be exploited by specula-
tors to create and profit from arbitrage opportunities that drive prices away from par-
ity.
The implementation of CBDC in parallel circulation with bank deposits raises cru-
cial questions of how to manage the in- and outflow of money through the public bud-
get. The analysis has shown how these questions force the Treasury into a dilemma. If
it accepts any kind of money in settlement of taxes and other payments from citizens,
it may find itself in the position of being forced to absorb bank deposits from money
users in a situation of crisis. While KN's design principles do protect commercial banks
and the central bank from bank runs, we might instead see a kind of 'run on the Trea-
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sury'. If, on the other hand, the Treasury refuses to accept anything but CBDC in set-
tlement of taxes and other payments from citizens, it would counteract the effort of the
central bank to maintain parity, as the utility of bank deposits would be significantly
decreased. In addition to this dilemma, the Treasury would also be faced with compli-
cated questions about whether to sell and settle gilts in CBDC or bank deposits.
In the final section of our analysis, we have questioned the assumption that by keep-
ing CBDC separate from reserves, the central bank may retain the reserve rate as a
distinct monetary policy tool. The only utility of reserves is the settlement of interbank
debts created by the transfer of bank deposits. This means that in the event of a crisis,
where parity between CBDC and bank deposits is broken, the price of reserves would
follow bank deposits rather than CBDC. CBDC rather than reserves is thus the true
risk-free form of money and the interest rate on CBDC rather than the interest rate on
reserves will be the risk-free interest in the economy, which will serve as the key rate
for investment and asset allocation decisions. While the reserve rate may indeed be ad-
justed independently from the rate on CBDC, the former would have little macroeco-
nomic significance.
Policy Implications
In the introduction, we touched upon the way that the debate about CBDC involves
both the question of whether to implement and also how to implement CBDC. KN's pa-
per  is  primarily  concerned with  the  latter  question.  Even though the analysis  has
shown that KN's design principles may not be as effective in guaranteeing parity be-
tween bank deposits and CBDC as suggested by the two authors, this does not imply
that the implementation of CBDC is necessarily a bad idea. The reason, why the prob-
lem of parity emerges in the first place, is because a CBDC is a more stable form of
money than bank deposits as it does not carry any credit risk. If implemented cor-
rectly, CBDC may thus add stability to the financial system as well as to the general
economy. It may also provide the central bank with a more effective monetary policy
tool than what is currently at its disposal.
The analysis also does not imply that the four design principles proposed by KN are
necessarily bad ideas. The most novel  contribution of KN's proposal  to the debate
about CBDC is probably the principle (iii) of relieving commercial banks as well as the
central bank from the obligation to guarantee direct convertibility between bank de-
posits and CBDC. This is referred to as a market based solution to the problem of par-
ity as it the price of CBDC relative to bank deposits is to be settled by private agents
buying and selling. The central bank only intervenes indirectly in the markets by ad-
justing the CBDC interest rate and by buying gilts for CBDC.
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What we have seen in the analysis, however, is that the other three principles do
not suffice to make this market based solution work properly. I thus propose to supple-
ment KN's proposal with an additional two principles: (v) The central bank is not only
relieved of the obligation of direct convertibility but even the very responsibility for
parity between CBDC and bank deposits. The central bank shall thus refrain from
monetary policy interventions in the market to support parity as well as from the is-
suance of explicit or implicit guarantees of deposit insurance. (vi) The Treasury does
not accept bank deposits in taxes and other payments to the government. The purpose
of these two principles is to pave the way for a truly market based solution to the
problem of parity.
As the central bank and the government relinquish responsibility for the price of
bank deposits, the exchange rate to CBDC will be determined in the market without
any form of state intervention. Rather than bank money being treated at par with cen-
tral bank money, commercial banks would now be treated at par with other forms of
private enterprises, which receive no state support for the maintenance of the value of
their liabilities. In turn, the price of bank deposits would be determined by the evalua-
tion of the solidity of the issuing bank by markets and money users. This is no different
than the way that stocks,  corporate bonds and many other securities are currently
priced.  The benchmark  against  which  bank deposits  and other  securities  would  be
priced would be CBDC, which would de jure as well as de facto be the only concrete
unit of account (besides cash) of the national currency.
The starting point of KN's proposal was to design and implement CBDC in a way,
which would not curtail the two key functions of the existing banking system: 'provi-
sion of credit to borrowers and the provision of liquidity to depositors.' The conclusion
to this paper is that KN's four principles are only a halfway solution, which may even-
tually prove to be fragile in the event of a crisis. A question for further research is
whether the addition of the above two principles would indeed create a more robust
system without curtailing the provision of credit and liquidity. If the central bank and
the Treasury relinquish responsibility for the maintenance of parity, it would be be-
stowed on the banking sector itself to either attract enough deposits of CBDC to meet
the demand for CBDC credit from borrowers or to make sure that bank deposits would
remain generally accepted as liquid payments despite the lack of state support. I hope
to address this problem in a subsequent paper.
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